Thursday, September 25, 2008

東亞2

東亞報警及相信涉內鬼代表什麼?

代表公司的確係有內部問題, 不致於倒閉, 但問題亦唔簡單

事件可能由前排果單...員工炒輸輪繼而造數....所產生的風險管理問題

如果造謠只是單純令股價下跌而入貨, 不能解釋那麼多的沽空....

如果沽空是落井下石....似乎成本太大

雖知沽空乃專業行為....無知的市民只會走去排隊而非沽空....

點都好, 就算睇好銀行股, 點都未揀到東亞...

1 comment:

港燦 said...

Agree, though no need to queue up anxiously with kaifongs for hours in dusty streets with choking air during past few days , to restore public confidence , more has to be done and disclosed to the public by BEA.



南華早報 | 2008-09-27
BIZ12 Money Matters
Shirley Yam

We've been left in the dark over Bank of East Asia mess



Mr X is the chief financial controller of a Hong Kong blue chip company. On Wednesday he advised his brother-in-law to pull his savings out of the Bank of East Asia.

Unlike most of us, Mr X knows about capital adequacy ratios and liquidity ratios. He also knows BEA's reported ratios are way above average. What I don't know is whether the bank's management knows what is really on its books, he told me.

Mr X may be cynical, but he is not being unreasonable.

A few days before the bank run, BEA, which has repeatedly assured the public of its limited exposure to the troubled credit-related products, revealed that a rogue trader had cheated on some equity derivative deals that wiped HK$131 million, or 12 per cent, off the bank's original 2008 interim profit.

Not only did the internal control system fail to catch him, but also the internal audit and review by the external auditor.

A week has gone by since the manipulation of records by the rogue trader was exposed, but the public remains in the dark about how it happened and what remedial actions have been taken.

All the public has been told is that it was an isolated incident and that the same external auditor will conduct a special review on its internal control system. Oh, that's really comforting!

At a time of such low investor confidence, this sort of approach by the bank is unacceptable. It may not have been a direct cause of the bank run but it certainly laid the foundation.

In this sense, the experience of French bank Societe Generale - victim of the largest fraud by a single trader (also involving derivatives) - is very illuminating.

Within three days of the fraud becoming public, the French bank provided an explanatory note detailing how it was perpetrated, how it was uncovered, the unwinding of the fraudulent position and the measures taken to remedy it.

A special committee of independent directors with sweeping powers was formed to review the internal control and risk management process at the bank. Its chairman and chief executive handed in their resignations - they were subsequently rejected by the board. The bank managed the crisis with few hiccups.

Some may say: Well, that's France. But for those who see no point in comparing us with the more sophisticated developed markets, I would like to refresh their memories about the Bank of China (Hong Kong) scandal.

In mid-2003, Beijing arrested Shanghai developer Chau Ching-ngai in relation to the investigation of the then BOCHK head Liu Jianbao. Subsequently, it was revealed that the bank had loaned Chau HK$1.77 billion in a questionable deal.

BOCHK's management put out a things are normal announcement, which not only failed to pacify investors but also increased doubts about the integrity of the bank and Hong Kong's regulatory regime.

Three days later after a consultation with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the bank made an about-turn. A special committee of independent directors was formed to review and investigate with assistance from a former British banking regulator. The HKMA had a say in its terms of reference and ensured the report went public in three months.

Three external audit firms were hired to review the bank's financial report, the system and control as well as the loan in question. There is no reason why the HKMA should not take the same initiative in the case of BEA.

First, it is in the interests of the bank's shareholders. Yes, BEA's trading loss was only a fraction of BOCHK's questionable loan, but it wiped out 12 per cent of BEA's profit, while the questionable loan was less than 1 per cent of BOCHK's loan book.

Second, like the BOCHK scandal, it puts the integrity of the Hong Kong regulatory regime at stake.

The HKMA has been proud of its hands-on monitoring system, which focuses on individual deals. So, how did the BEA mess happen right under its nose? And how did it happen when regulators worldwide are on full alert over bank risk management controls?

Leaving these questions unanswered and hoping the market will forget is certainly not a clever thing to do at a time when a single rumour can easily bring a bank down.

##HIDEME##